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Fodder Price Risk and Evolution of
Rural Markets
So far in this study, market conditions have been assumed to be exogenously
determined, a standard assumption in agricultural household models (Singh,
Squire, and Strauss 1986). In other words, the previous chapters were mainly
focused on the question of how households’ individual decisions are affected
by the incompleteness of the rural market structure. This chapter attempts to
move one step further to the question of how aggregate household decisions
affect the incompleteness of the rural market structure. It is expected that
rural markets evolve from autarky to an incomplete set of imperfect markets,
and then to a situation closer to a complete set of perfect markets, through the
feedback between households (microeconomic agents) and markets.
As a preliminary step to investigate the evolution of rural markets, simula-
tion exercises were run in this chapter based on the household model esti-
mated in Chapter 6. In the terminology of mathematical programming, this
chapter provides a sensitivity analysis of particular parameters that would be
important in assessing the process of market evolution and the potential for
policy interventions.1
The analysis particularly focuses on two issues. First, how substantial is
the welfare cost of risk, especially that of fodder price risk? Households under
uncertainty decide on their production plans to maximize expected utility from
consumption, resulting in an optimal production decision which is different
from the plan that maximizes expected profit. This difference is a potential
source of social inefficiency due to risk, but little is known about its empirical
incidence. Second, what kind of supply response and welfare impact does a
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change in fodder market structure have, and how is this change related to
households’ aggregate decisions? The emphasis is placed on green fodder
markets since they are thin and characterized by volatile price movements
(Chapter 4).
The first section is a review of the current structure of green fodder markets
in the study area. Simulation methods are described briefly in the second sec-
tion. Simulation results are presented in the third section (the welfare cost of
risk) and in the fourth section (changes in the fodder market structure).
I. Green Fodder Markets and Households’ Market
Participation
As shown in Chapter 4, market prices of green fodder in the last two decades
were the most volatile and increased at the highest trend rates among major
agricultural commodities in the area. Although not indicated in the table there,
the data of green fodder prices show more missing values in months with
small supply than those of cereal and dry fodder prices, which implies that
markets are not reliable sources of green fodder supply in a certain period of
a year.
These empirical observations suggest that green fodder markets are local in
nature. Transactions of green fodder began after tractors became popular in
the Punjab. In this sense, green fodder markets are the newest among agricul-
tural output markets in the region. Because of its bulkiness and perishability,
green fodder is highly characteristic of local commodities, in sharp contrast to
wheat and basmati. From the viewpoint of risk-averse farmers, the structure
of green fodder markets entails a high risk of transactions.
Table 8-1 summarizes market participation by sample households.2 About
three-fourths of the sample households neither purchased nor sold green fod-
der. Green fodder sale was more prevalent in the rabi season (26 per cent
participation rate) than in kharif (19 per cent) when grasses on fields and
banks are available. Only 2.1 to 2.8 per cent of the sample households pur-
chased green fodder. As already shown in Table 4-1, the proportion of house-
holds with market participation experience was not negligible—33 to 38 per
cent of the households sold green fodder in kharif or in rabi and 3 to 5 per cent
purchased green fodder in the study period.
Table 8-2 shows similar information in terms of quantity. The ratio of the
quantity of green fodder purchased from outside to the total feeding quantity
was only 3.4 per cent in kharif and 1.5 per cent in rabi. The ratio of the quan-
tity of green fodder sold to the market to the total production quantity was
only 10.7 per cent in kharif and 12.4 per cent in rabi.
Comparison of these tables indicates that households were well aware of
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the existence of market transactions of green fodder and sometimes partici-
pated in them if necessary. Nevertheless, it was more common for them to
participate only marginally. Regardless of market participation status, many
households produced most of their needs from their fields. It should be em-
phasized here that even those purchasing households would have produced
sufficient green fodder if they had allocated all available land to green fodder.
They instead grew other crops for markets but not to an extent that they had to
depend completely on purchased green fodder. In other words, those house-
holds with tighter land constraints decided on the area allocated to green fod-
der (and thereby the extent of market dependence) by fully considering the
tradeoff between growing green fodder crops and other crops.
II. Simulation Methodology
The household model in Chapter 6 incorporates tradeoff among crops in a
theoretically consistent way. The tradeoff not only involves relative profit-
ability, but also profit variability and consumption stability. By growing crops
whose profits are less variable and less positively correlated with other sources
of income, households can obtain a sort of income insurance (portfolio ef-
fects); by growing crops whose profits are positively correlated with prices of
major consumption items, households can obtain a sort of consumption price
insurance (consumption price effects) (Kurosaki 1995b, chap. 3; Fafchamps
1992a).
The welfare effects of changes in market parameters can be evaluated based
on equivalent variation and compensating variation. Denoting an instanta-
TABLE  8-1
CLASSIFICATION OF SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS BY FODDER MARKET
PARTICIPATION IN EACH CROPPING SEASON
Sale Purchase Non-participant
No. % No. % No. %
Green fodder in kharif 55 (19.0) 8 ( 2.8) 226 (78.2)
Green fodder in rabi 74 (25.6) 6 ( 2.1) 209 (72.3)
Dry fodder: bhusa 56 (19.4) 26 ( 9.0) 207 (71.6)
Dry fodder: rice straw 101 (34.9) 0 ( 0.0) 188 (65.1)
Cottonseed cake 0 ( 0.0) 286 (99.0) 3 ( 1.0)
Source: The author’s calculation. The original information was collected by the Punjab
Economic Research Institute. See the text in Chapter 2 for more details.
Notes: 1. The number of observations is 289 since two observations without livestock
animals were omitted.
2. Numbers in the parenthesis indicate percentage to 289 observations.
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neous indirect utility function by v (y, p) as before, the welfare status in the
default setting (subscript 0) can be expressed as E [v (f (l0*, µ0, θ0), p(µ0)], where
E is the expectation operator, µ is a vector of stochastic market parameters
that affect consumption prices and production profits, θ denotes a vector of
stochastic production parameters such as the mean yield and yield variance,
and household income f (...) is determined by the optimal crop choice (l*), and
stochastic vectors of µ and θ.
By denoting a lump-sum transfer by τ, supply response of the optimal pro-
duction choice (∆l*), a change in expected income (∆E (y*)), compensating
variation (τC), and equivalent variation (τE) of a change from regime (µ0, θ0)
to regime (µ1, θ1) are defined as
∆l l l* * *, , ,≡ ( ) − ( )1 1 1 0 0 0µ θ µ θ
TABLE  8-2
FODDER MANAGEMENT BY SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS
Annual Fodder Expenditure per AUa (1988/89 Rs.)
Fed to Produced Sold to Purchased
Animals from Farm Markets from Markets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Green fodder in kharif 578.9 626.0 67.0 19.9
[27.2%] (10.7%) (3.4%)
Green fodder in rabi 933.7 1,050.6 130.7 13.8
[43.9%] (12.4%) (1.5%)
Dry fodder: bhusa 335.0 374.0 49.6 10.6
[15.7%] (13.3%) (3.2%)
Dry fodder: rice straw 125.6 145.9 20.3 0.0
[5.9%] (13.9%) (0.0%)
Cottonseed cake 152.9 0.0 0.0 152.9
[7.2%] (n.a.) (100.0%)
Total 2,126.1
[100.0%]
Source: See Table 8-1.
Notes: 1. The number of observations is 289 since two observations without animals
were omitted.
2. Numbers in the brackets in column (1) indicate the percentage to the total
fodder expenditure.
3. Numbers in the parenthesis in column (3) indicate the percentage to column
(2).
4. Numbers in the parenthesis in column (4) indicate the percentage to column
(1).
a Adult-animal equivalent unit.
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∆E y E f l E f l* * *, , , , ,( ) ≡ ( )[ ]− ( )[ ]1 1 1 0 0 0µ θ µ θ
E v f l p E v f l pC0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1* *, , , ˆ , , , ,µ θ µ µ θ τ µ( ) ( )( )[ ] = ( ) − ( )( )[ ]
E v f l p E v f l pEˆ , , , , , , ,* *0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1µ θ τ µ µ θ µ( ) + ( )( )[ ] = ( ) ( )( )[ ]
where
l l E v f l pi i i i
l
i i i
* *
, , , , ,= ( ) ≡ ( ) ( )( )[ ]µ θ µ θ µargmax i =0, 1,
ˆ ˆ , , , , , ,
* *l l E v f l pE
l
E0 0 0 0 0 0 0= ( ) ≡ ( ) + ( )( )[ ]µ θ τ µ θ τ µargmax
ˆ ˆ , , , , , .
* *l l E v f l pC
l
C1 1 1 1 1 1 1= ( ) ≡ ( ) − ( )( )[ ]µ θ τ µ θ τ µargmax
The risk premium is defined as τC in (8.1) when the new regime (µ1, θ1) is
set to the expected values of (µ0, θ0) with zero variance (Pratt 1964; Newbery
and Stiglitz 1981). It is interpreted as the maximum amount of money an
agent is willing to pay for a situation without risk. Equivalent variation for a
riskless environment, τE, which is interpreted as the amount of money that
should be given to an agent under the initial risky regime to make it indiffer-
ent between the two regimes, was also estimated for comparison purposes.3
These measures of supply response and welfare changes are estimated using
numerical methods, whose details are given in the appendix to this chapter.
Welfare effects of partial risk elimination are defined in a similar way from
(8.1).
Simulations are run for three household groups: “AVG,” the reference house-
hold group with median characteristics among the sample households; “Land-
Poor,” the household group with half the size of operational land and other
characteristics remaining the same; and “Livestock-Poor,” the household group
with half the size of livestock herd and other characteristics remaining the
same. The “AVG” group is likely to be close to self-sufficiency in green fod-
der and almost always to have a surplus in wheat and basmati paddy; the
“Land-Poor” group is a purchaser of green fodder on average and sometimes
is a purchaser of wheat for family consumption; the “Livestock-Poor” group
is a net seller of green fodder, wheat and basmati paddy, on average.
III. Welfare Costs of Risk
Table 8-3 gives results simulated for a riskless environment. The reference
household group (“AVG”) would increase the area devoted to basmati paddy
by 29 per cent and that to wheat by 47 per cent. This resource reallocation
(8.1)
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results in an increase in expected income to the magnitude of 2.0 per cent of
the initial expected income. This is the amount of expected income sacrificed
for risk considerations. The welfare cost of risk measured by τE is estimated at
7.9 per cent of the initial expected income.
In the second column of the table, the welfare costs of fodder price risk are
estimated, by eliminating the variability of green fodder prices only. A sur-
prising finding is that, of the total welfare cost of 7.9 per cent in the first
column, as large as 4.9 points (or about 62 per cent) are attributable solely to
the price risk of green fodder. Only by eliminating the green fodder price risk
in kharif and rabi can households eliminate more than half of the total welfare
cost of risk. The finding that the fodder area would decrease dramatically
implies that the volatile price of green fodder forces households to grow green
fodder to avoid the price risk. By growing green fodder on their farms, farm-
ers can stabilize their welfare level through portfolio effects due to the nega-
tive correlation between milk profit and fodder profit, and, through consump-
tion-price effects due to the positive correlation between fodder profit and
food prices. But this adjustment causes a loss of expected income and also it
is not sufficient to stabilize real income completely. Here lies the major source
of the welfare costs of risk.
TABLE  8-3
SIMULATION RESULTS FOR WELFARE COSTS OF RISK
(%)
Complete Risk Green Fodder
Elimination Price Elimination
“AVG” household:
1. Supply response (change in area)
Basmati paddy 29.2 11.3
Kharif fodder −37.0 −13.3
Wheat 47.0 32.7
Rabi fodder −100.0 −66.9
2. Change in expected income (EY)
% to the initial EY 2.0 1.6
3. Welfare change (equivalent variation)
% to the initial EY 7.9 4.9
“Land-Poor” household:
Welfare change (equivalent variation)
% to the initial EY 10.9 9.2
“Livestock-Poor” household:
Welfare change (equivalent variation)
% to the initial EY 7.2 1.9
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When green fodder price risk is eliminated, households no longer need to
consider these effects of growing green fodder. As indicated in the first four
rows in the table, households would decrease the area devoted to fodder and
would begin to purchase it from the market. This is in sharp contrast to
Sandmo’s (1971) classic derivation that the output of a risk-averse firm is
lower under price risk. In our case, a risk-averse firm produces more green
fodder under green fodder price risk.
The welfare cost of risk, especially of green fodder price risk, is higher for
the households with a small land area relative to their livestock herd size. The
numbers in the bottom two rows show that the welfare costs of risk rise as the
relative size of livestock herd increases. Especially, for the “Land-Poor” group,
the welfare costs of green fodder price risk are estimated to be as high as 9.2
per cent of the initial expected income.
These simulation results suggest a vicious circle. Volatility in green fodder
market prices induces farmers to pursue self-sufficiency in green fodder. Low
market participation in green fodder markets by these households, in aggre-
gate, results in thin markets with inelastic supply and demand. These are in-
deed the major reasons for price volatility in local fodder markets.
Another implication is the relative ineffectiveness of crop insurance schemes
focused on major food-grain crops. At least for farmers in the study region,
simulation results confirm that the welfare costs of grain yield risk are not
large. Therefore, crop insurance schemes that are currently debated in Paki-
stan,4 are not likely to attract farmers’ keen interests. This finding is similar to
that reported for the ICRISAT households (Bakker 1990; Walker, Singh, and
Asokan 1986). It is more likely that interests on crop insurance schemes ob-
served for some farmers in Pakistan are based on their expectation for purely
distributive effects of these schemes. They would demand insurance only when
the insurance is actuarially biased in favor of farmers, for instance, with an
asymmetric income compensation in the event of crop failure without any
significant premium to pay.
IV. Effects of Changes in Fodder Market Structure
An obvious natural question is, then, how a change in the structure of local
green fodder markets induces a change in household decisions so that the
vicious circle is broken. To analyze the effects of changes in green fodder
markets rigorously, a sector model that describes market supply and demand
is necessary, even if possible general equilibrium effects in the national
economy can be ignored. Instead of constructing a fully integrated sector model,
however, this chapter focuses on market equilibrium effects for green fodder
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crops only, because fodder price is the most volatile and has the characteris-
tics of non-tradables that generate the need for a multi-market analysis. Since
wheat and basmati markets are assumed to be integrated with national mar-
kets, changes in local fodder markets do not affect the price distribution of
these two commodities in local markets.
The figures already presented in Table 8-3 do not incorporate the market
equilibrium effects for green fodder. The table shows that risk elimination
would give households a strong incentive to grow more wheat and basmati.
Nevertheless, aggregate effects in local fodder markets might result in higher
fodder prices because green fodder is almost a non-tradable commodity from
the viewpoint of local markets. A model of local fodder markets incorporates
this feedback.
1. Modeling Local Fodder Markets
To incorporate the stylized characteristics of fodder markets in the study
area described in Chapter 4, and, to make the model consistent with the as-
sumptions presented in Chapter 6, the following, simple model was constructed.
Since the market demand is the sum of the demand from livestock breeders, it
is fixed at the sum of the number of livestock animals in the region multiplied
by the coefficient of per-animal fodder needs. Market supply is the sum of the
supply from agricultural households and a residual source of green fodder
supply. As in Chapter 6, household fodder production is assumed to be sto-
chastic around a fixed mean. When an adverse yield shock hits fodder crops in
the region, the shipment of green fodder from neighboring regions or the col-
lection of green grass from fields might occur to meet the deficit. The residual
source of green fodder supply includes these expensive supplies. Since the
residual source cannot adjust elastically to urgent market needs, realized mar-
ket prices show large fluctuations.
From the farm households’ viewpoint, this market structure is equivalent to
a market with a completely inelastic supply curve from the household sector
and a negatively sloped demand curve. The vertical supply curve shifts hori-
zontally depending on the yield shock to households’ fodder production. Since
the residual supply source is assumed to be exogenous to the household sec-
tor, a market demand curve from the perspective of agricultural households
shows a negative slope, in which the absolute value of price elasticity corre-
sponds to the supply elasticity from the residual sector. Denoting this demand
elasticity by η, an iso-elastic demand curve from the households’ perspective,
D(p), is specified as
D p Ap( ) = η . (8.2)
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Then, using a Taylor expansion (Mood, Graybill, and Bose 1974; Fafchamps
1992a), the CV of the price can be approximated by:
CV CV
CV
p
Q
Q
=
− + −



η η
1
2
1 1 2
, (8.3)
where CVQ is the coefficient of variation of the total quantity of green fodder
implicitly traded in the local market.
CVp was estimated at 0.353 for fodder in kharif and at 0.415 for fodder in
rabi, the highest values among the commodities concerned (Chapter 4, Table
4-3). Based on the yield data used in Chapter 5 and a time-series model simi-
lar to price regression models in Chapter 4, CVQ was estimated at around 0.05.
With this information, η, the market price elasticity from the households’ view-
point, was estimated at −0.12 for kharif fodder and −0.10 for rabi fodder.
These estimates confirm that the market price of green fodder is volatile as a
result of inelastic fodder demand. Missing fodder markets are a limit case
when the elasticity approaches zero.
2. Effects of More Elastic Market Demand
In the previous section, variability in green fodder prices was eliminated
without considering how the prices can be practically stabilized. The simula-
tion was justified since its sole purpose was to estimate the welfare costs of
price risk. Now, given the fodder market structure as above, what would hap-
pen if the green fodder prices were stabilized because the market demand
from the households’ viewpoint became more price-elastic?
Table 8-4 shows simulation results when the values for η were doubled.
From equation (8.3), it was deduced that doubling of η values would result in
fodder price stabilization—the CV of green fodder price in kharif would fall
from 0.353 to 0.187 and that in rabi would fall from 0.415 to 0.225.
In the first column, the effects of a kharif demand change are shown. Fod-
der price stabilization in kharif gives households an incentive to grow more
basmati paddy since its expected profitability is higher. However, due to the
opposite effects from induced fodder price rises, households would be able to
increase the paddy area only marginally. Similarly, the second column shows
that fodder price stabilization in rabi would lead to a marginal increase in
wheat area. Even when the two changes in demand elasticities occur simulta-
neously (column 3), households would increase the area under food-grain
crops only marginally: 0.7 per cent for paddy and 0.2 per cent for wheat.
Nevertheless, the adjustment would increase households’ expected income
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by 1.3 per cent and households’ welfare by 2.7 per cent. As Table 8-3 showed,
the experimental, complete fodder price stabilization would enhance house-
holds’ welfare by 4.9 per cent. Of this 4.9 per cent welfare gain, 2.7 points (or
about 55 per cent) could be attained by a more practical fodder price stabiliza-
tion. The difference is due to two reasons: first, fodder prices were stabilized
only partially in this simulation; second, induced increases in expected fodder
prices would prevent households from shifting to food-grain crops significantly.
The two rows at the bottom of Table 8-4 show the welfare effects on the
“Land-Poor” and the “Livestock-Poor” household types. “Land-Poor” house-
holds would gain more and “Livestock-Poor” households would gain less than
the reference group. Compared with the figures in Table 8-3, however, the
decrease in welfare gain from 9.2 per cent to 3.8 per cent for “Land-Poor”
households is relatively larger than that for the “Livestock-Poor” from 1.9 per
cent to 1.5 per cent. This is natural since the adverse effects of induced in-
creases in expected fodder prices are larger for households with a relatively
larger livestock herd.
TABLE  8-4
EFFECTS OF MORE ELASTIC FODDER DEMAND
(%)
Kharif &
Rabi
“AVG” household:
1. Supply response (change in area)
Basmati paddy 0.6 0.4 0.7
Kharif fodder −0.6 −0.5 −0.8
Wheat 0.2 0.1 0.2
Rabi fodder −0.4 −0.2 −0.4
2. Change in expected income (EY)
% to the initial EY 0.3 0.7 1.3
3. Welfare change (equivalent variation)
% to the initial EY 0.9 1.5 2.7
4. Induced changes in expected green fodder prices
Kharif fodder 2.6 2.1 3.5
Rabi fodder 1.9 1.1 2.2
“Land-Poor” household:
Welfare change (equivalent variation)
% to the initial EY 0.7 2.3 3.8
“Livestock-Poor” household:
Welfare change (equivalent variation)
% to the initial EY 0.6 0.8 1.5
Note: Price elasticity of green fodder demand is doubled.
Kharif Rabi
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3. Effects of an Increase in Fodder Yields Per Acre
What would happen if a change occurred in fodder crop technology, for
instance, an increase in expected fodder yields per acre? Table 8-5 shows
simulation results when expected fodder yields were increased by 20 per cent,
with demand elasticities remaining the same.5 The first group of rows shows
changes in crop area, which would seem substantial. However, the second
group of rows on changes in output quantity shows that households would
increase food-grain areas to the extent that fodder production would not change
appreciably. The first column for a change in kharif fodder yield shows that
households would increase the basmati paddy area by 12.2 per cent and de-
crease the kharif fodder area by 14.5 per cent. Since kharif fodder yield is
improved by 20 per cent, the adjustment would lead to an increase in kharif
fodder production of only 2.6 per cent. Nevertheless, this supply change would
decrease the expected fodder price in kharif significantly by 22.0 per cent
since this market has a very inelastic demand.
The second column shows a similar scenario when the expected fodder
yield in rabi increased by 20 per cent. When the change in fodder technology
occurred in both seasons, basmati paddy supply would increase by 12.3 per
cent and wheat supply would increase by 8.2 per cent (Table 8-5, column 3),
resulting in decreases in expected fodder prices: 21 per cent decrease in kharif
and 15 per cent decrease in rabi. The net effect on expected household in-
come is 6.4 per cent gain and that on household welfare is 7.4 per cent gain.
These results show that an increase in fodder yields would free more land
for cereal production whose expected profitability is higher. The last groups
of rows for the “Land-Poor” household group and “Livestock-Poor” house-
hold group confirm this conclusion. The land that would be available for cere-
als under increased fodder yields is relatively larger for households with a
larger livestock herd. On the other hand, households with a smaller livestock
herd would lose more from decreases in expected fodder profitability due to
induced reduction in fodder prices.
4. Effects of an Increase in Expected Cereal Prices
As a final experiment, the effects of rises in the mean prices of wheat and
basmati rice, i.e., price response of farms, were investigated with or without
changes in the fodder market structure. As described in Chapter 4, the Gov-
ernment of Pakistan is implementing deregulation policies in food-grain mar-
keting, which are likely to lead to an upward movement of domestic prices of
wheat and basmati. Although the deregulation policies had already started,
their effects on the mean market prices were not discernible during the survey
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period. Therefore, the effects of 20 per cent increases in cereal prices are
reported in this section, considering the existing estimates for implicit com-
modity taxation for wheat and basmati rice during the 1980s (Qureshi, Ghani,
and Mushtaq 1988; Salam 1992; JMA 1993).
Table 8-6 presents simulation results. When wheat and basmati prices in-
creased by 20 per cent without changes in the fodder market structure (col-
umn 1), the supply response of these food grains was significantly depressed.
The basmati paddy area increased by only 2.6 per cent and wheat area by only
0.7 per cent. If not for the effects of induced fodder price increases, house-
holds would want to expand cereal production more appreciably. However,
because of the equilibrium effects in green fodder markets, households would
be able to increase cereal areas only marginally. The adjustments would in-
crease households’ expected income by 11.5 per cent but because of increased
TABLE  8-5
EFFECTS OF 20% INCREASE IN EXPECTED FODDER YIELD PER ACRE
(%)
Kharif &
Rabi
“AVG” household
1. Supply response (change in area):
Basmati paddy 12.2 0.1 12.3
Kharif fodder −14.5 −0.1 −14.6
Wheat 0.1 8.1 8.2
Rabi fodder −0.2 −15.3 −15.5
Supply response (change in output quantity):
Basmati paddy 12.2 0.1 12.3
Kharif fodder 2.6 −0.1 2.5
Wheat 0.1 8.1 8.2
Rabi fodder −0.2 1.6 1.4
2. Change in expected income (EY):
% to the initial EY 3.2 3.1 6.4
3. Welfare change (equivalent variation):
% to the initial EY 3.7 3.7 7.4
4. Induced changes in expected green fodder prices:
Kharif fodder −22.0 1.2 −21.1
Rabi fodder 2.2 −16.6 −14.7
“Land-Poor” household:
Welfare change (equivalent variation)
% to the initial EY 5.0 5.3 10.6
“Livestock-Poor” household:
Welfare change (equivalent variation)
% to the initial EY 1.7 2.1 3.8
Kharif Rabi
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variability in household income and due to other repercussions, welfare gain
in terms of equivalent variation would be only 4.4 per cent. Furthermore, net
welfare effects for the “Land-Poor” household group are negative (−4.3 per
cent). Households with smaller land and larger livestock herds would not gain
much by increased cereal prices since their surplus is small or sometimes
negative; they might lose more from increases in expected fodder prices.
The second column in Table 8-6 shows the effects when cereal price in-
creases are accompanied by a more elastic fodder demand and thereby stabi-
lized fodder prices. The third column shows the effects when cereal price
TABLE  8-6
EFFECTS OF 20% INCREASE IN EXPECTED CEREAL PRICES
(%)
No Change Doubled 20% Rise in
in Fodder Demand Expected
Markets Elasticity Fodder Yield
(1) (2) (3)
“AVG” household:
1. Supply response (change in area)
Basmati paddy 2.6 3.9 14.1
Kharif fodder −3.0 −4.5 −16.9
Wheat 0.7 1.1 8.7
Rabi fodder −1.2 −2.1 −16.5
Supply response (change in output quantity)
Basmati paddy 2.6 3.9 14.1
Kharif fodder −3.0 −4.5 −0.2
Wheat 0.7 1.1 8.7
Rabi fodder −1.2 −2.1 0.2
2. Change in expected income (EY)
% to the initial EY 11.5 17.2 19.2
3. Welfare change (equivalent variation)
% to the initial EY 4.4 13.5 14.7
4. Induced changes in expected green fodder prices
Kharif fodder 24.6 18.5 1.9
Rabi fodder 12.3 10.6 −2.2
“Land-Poor” household:
Welfare change (equivalent variation)
% to the initial EY −4.3 6.5 9.5
“Livestock-Poor” household:
Welfare change (equivalent variation)
% to the initial EY 12.5 18.7 18.4
Notes: In column (1), expected prices of basmati and wheat are increased by 20 per
cent. In column (2), these prices are increased similarly, simultaneously with doubling
of price elasticities of green fodder demand in kharif and rabi. In column (3), these
prices are increased similarly, simultaneously with increases in expected yields of kharif
and rabi fodder crops by 20 per cent.
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increases and fodder yield improvements occur simultaneously. Both experi-
ments show that the food-grain supply response would become larger than the
case without a change in the fodder market structure. An important finding is
that when changes in the fodder market structure occur simultaneously, wel-
fare changes would become positive for all types of household groups. Their
magnitudes would become larger also—households’ welfare gain would be
as high as 13.5 per cent for the case with more elastic fodder demand and 14.7
per cent for the case with higher fodder yields. At the same time, there is a
change in green fodder market participation by households. Households with
relatively larger livestock herds would turn more to purchased fodder and
households with relatively larger land would sell more fodder to markets.
V. Summary and Policy Implications
In this chapter, a sensitivity analysis of the household model has been carried
out to obtain insights into the question of how the incompleteness of the rural
market structure is related to household decisions. It was found that the wel-
fare cost of risk is in the range of 7 to 11 per cent of the initial expected
income, being higher for land-poor households. These figures are comparable
with the estimates for semiarid India (Walker and Ryan 1990). Of these wel-
fare costs, those attributable to green fodder price risk alone account for the
major part. Only by eliminating green fodder price risk, can households elimi-
nate more than half of the total welfare cost of risk. This finding suggests that
since a crop insurance scheme to hedge against yield risk may not enhance
households’ welfare significantly, households’ demand for such a scheme would
not be substantial.
Simulation results based on a simple model of iso-elastic market demand
for green fodder have highlighted the importance of elastic fodder demand or
yield innovation in green fodder production. The results suggest that these
changes would improve household welfare, especially that of poorer sections,
with more active green fodder markets. Especially if fodder yields were to be
improved, the pressure on scarce land to meet household fodder needs could
be reduced, thereby leaving more land for cereal crops under less distorted
market environments. The fodder yield improvement would increase fodder
supply to markets from households that already produce fodder for markets,
thereby contributing to fodder price stabilization. By combining the two in-
novations in fodder technology, larger welfare gains for agricultural house-
holds and deeper green fodder markets could be expected.
Simulation results have also shown that the supply response of cereal crops
to an increase in their expected prices would be much larger when the market
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demand for fodder is more elastic or fodder yields are improved. Demand for
green fodder becomes more elastic when technological innovations occur that
create cheaper substitutes for green fodder or that make green fodder more
storable and easier to transport. In Pakistan, public expenditure on agricul-
tural research and extension has concentrated on increasing food-grain pro-
ductivity, neglecting fodder crops, since “fodder crops seem to be nobody’s
responsibility” (GOP, Ministry of Food and Agriculture 1988, p. 192). This
chapter has shown that additional public investment in fodder technology could
contribute to an enhanced production of cereals and to the improvement of
household welfare.
Appendix to Chapter 8
Numerical Methods to Estimate Welfare Measures
In this appendix the technical procedures to estimate welfare measures such
as compensating variation (τC) and equivalent variation (τE) are outlined. Supply
response is estimated as a by-product. Since the distribution of income is en-
dogenous to household production decisions, approximating the two welfare
measures by a closed-form expression (Newbery and Stiglitz 1981; Turnovsky,
Shalit, and Schmitz 1980) might result in a large bias. To avoid this bias as
much as possible, a numerical method based on algorithms to find zero-roots
of a system was directly applied to estimate τC and τE. The mathematical prob-
lem for τC was to solve the following equation:
F Cτ µ θ µ θ0 0 1 1, , ,( )[ ] (8.A1)
≡ ( ) ( )( )[ ] − ( ) − ( )( )[ ] =E v f l p E v f l pC0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0* *, , , ˆ , , , ,µ θ µ µ θ τ µ
where li* is defined in (8.1), (µ0, θ0) denotes the initial regime of stochastic
environment, and (µ1, θ1) denotes its new regime. A computer algorithm solves
equation (8.A1) in the following way. Any value of τC has corresponding op-
timal decisions (l0* and ˆl1*). By inserting these decisions, a value of F [τC] can
be calculated, which need not be zero. The value of τC should be changed and
the whole procedure repeated. When a value of τC that results in zero value of
function F is determined, the compensating variation is obtained. The algo-
rithm consists of an inner loop that calculates the value of F [τC] and an outer
loop that searches for an optimal τC. A FORTRAN program was written to
solve this problem.
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Inner Loop
In the first step in the inner loop the optimal value of l* must be determined
and in the second step the value of F [τC] must be calculated. Since the empiri-
cal household model in Chapter 6 is based on a first-order Taylor approxima-
tion to the derivatives of an indirect utility function, the values of expected
utility in the simulations are approximated using a second-order Taylor ap-
proximation to the indirect utility function.6
To determine the optimal value of l*, a system of four nonlinear equations
should be solved. This system consists of two equations that represent pro-
duction constraints and two equations that are derived from the first-order
conditions for the optimal crop choice (Chapter 6). Although the system does
not have an explicit solution for l*, it can be reduced to a system of two equa-
tions with two unknowns of three-order polynomials. Let this system be de-
noted by G(l*) =0. Newton’s method, which uses first derivatives, can solve
this type of problem by revising the n-th guess (ln) by the following formula
(Gill, Murray, and Wright 1981; Atkinson 1989):
l l G l
l
G ln n n n+
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= −
( )
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
 ( )1
1∂
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(8.A2)
The use of the algorithm enabled to find a solution quickly and stably for the
model in this chapter.
In the second step the value of F [τC] is calculated using the optimal l* de-
termined in the first step. The expectation operator in (8.A1) is replaced by an
expression based on a second-order Taylor approximation to v(y, p).7 To mini-
mize an approximation error, the approximation point is reset in every itera-
tion at the new expected income.
Outer Loop
The outer loop of the algorithm revises the value of τC in each iteration to
find a zero-root of F [τC]. Newton’s method is not applicable because the func-
tion F [τC] has no explicit form. Therefore, for the outer loop the secant method
that uses observed slope information instead of first derivatives (Gill, Murray,
and Wright 1981; Atkinson 1989) is applied. The secant method revises the
n-th guess (τC, n) in each iteration by the following formula:
τ τ
τ τ
τ τ
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(8.A3)
The algorithm converged to a solution rapidly and stably.
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Compensating vs. Equivalent Variation
Equivalent variation can be estimated similarly. The mathematical problem
to be solved for τE is
F Eτ µ θ µ θ0 0 1 1, , ,( )[ ] (8.A4)
≡ ( ) + ( )( )[ ]− ( ) ( )( )[ ] =E V f l p E V f l pEˆ , , , , , , .* *0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0µ θ τ µ µ θ µ
The use of the same algorithm of an inner loop and an outer loop enables to
solve this problem quickly and stably.
When only one experiment is simulated, the two algorithms for equivalent
variation and for compensating variation have to use the same loop structure.
When a large number of experiments are simulated repeatedly, however, the
algorithm for equivalent variation has one advantage in saving computation
time. The first term in (8.A4) is a function of τE with parameters (µ0, θ0). Since
µ0 and θ0 represent the default regime, they do not change in any simulations.
Therefore, once a whole grid of the first term is constructed as a function of
τE, recalculation of the outer loop is not needed for an additional simulation.
In contrast, for the definition of compensating variation in (8.A1), τC is in
the second term with parameters (µ1, θ1). Since µ1 and θ1 change in each simu-
lation run, the outer loop has to be recalculated every time. Thus, the algo-
rithm for compensating variation cannot save computation time.
Notes
1 A summary of the simulation results included in this chapter is presented in
Kurosaki (1996c).
2 The figures in this table are smaller than those in Table 4-1 in which households
with market participation experience in the survey period were enumerated. In
Table 8-2, only households that participated in market transactions in a particular
cropping season were enumerated.
3 As Kurosaki (1995b, chap 6) showed, the compensating variation and the equiva-
lent variation move very closely, which justifies the exclusive use of equivalent
variation as a welfare measure in the discussion in this chapter. See Willig (1976)
and Just, Hueth, and Schmitz (1982) for the relationships among the two welfare
measures and consumer surplus. See the appendix to this chapter for an algorithm
advantage in using equivalent variation.
4 In early 1996, the Government of Pakistan considered the introduction of a crop
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insurance scheme for wheat, rice, cotton, sugarcane, and tobacco, against the crop
losses due to flood, excessive rain, drought, and locust attack. The government’s
intention was to make it compulsory for all the farmers who seek bank credit. In
1986, a pilot crop insurance scheme was experimented for cotton, without suc-
cess (Dawn newspaper 1996, Feb. 15 and Feb. 19; Fasihuddin 1996).
5 It is assumed in the simulation that the 20 per cent increases in expected yields
are associated with 44 per cent increases in variances so that the CVs of fodder
yields do not change.
6 Another method uses a stochastic simulation (Chavas and Holt 1996; O’Donnell
1993). However, it is not practically possible to apply the method to this study
because the number of disturbance terms is too large. There are price and yield
risks to the output from six farm activities: food-grain crop, fodder crop, and milk
in kharif and rabi seasons. Chavas and Holt (1996) reported that even the
quadravariate normal distribution requires a very large computational space.
7 See equations (6.8) and (6.10) in Chapter 6 for the functional form of v (y, p).
